REMOTE VOTING: ARE I-ELECTIONS OUR FUTURE?

Author: Lena Anna Kuklińska

Abstract:

The pandemic of COVID-19 forced governments around the world to hurriedly consider the possibility of implementing the so-called i-voting ad hoc, or even ‘for good’. It became practically impossible to hold physical elections, yet certain arrangements, such as constitutional deadlines, ought to have been respected. The enunciated analysis revealed several accuracies. First of all, the systems of remote voting have been tested by numerous states. Amidst the outbreak of COVID-19, most governments opted for postal voting; however, anteriorly, some states had also tested the means of i-voting, via fax, mail or online portals and apps, predominantly relying on the security instruments offered by the traditional letter voting. As it emerged, postal voting is still deemed potent of ensuring that the pivotal features of voting, spoken of in many international and constitutional acts, are respected and sufficiently protected. The voting mode is not defectless; nevertheless, most of the issues associated with it can be resolved by what the other type of remote voting, via the internet, offers - at the very least, convenience and the lack of dangers inherent to physical interferences. In spite of that, it has been argued that i-voting is more susceptible to elusive manipulation. What has not been directly highlighted by academia to a significant extent, is that remote voting, no matter the mode, could be used as a tool for controlling or fabricating the results by governments. There are many advantages and shortcomings of either voting technique or method used. It has been assumed that i-voting is the future of balloting in general, hence, most of this paper is dedicated to exploring methods of improving the online systems, to devoid them of the flaws that make them susceptible to failures and external incursions. The regulators are urged to consider the points highlighted in this piece to design and endorse a satisfactory system of i-voting, just so, apart from the other, more anthropological arguments of human development towards convenience or fully unrestricted mobility, there is no repetition of the problematic situation some governments had to face upon the obligatory lockdowns. Technology and law are to facilitate human development. I-voting may become inevitable one way or another and hence, possibly, we should consider conforming our views, priorities and systems, in case the gloomy predictions of some specialists render to be accurate and full protection of the remote procedure is unattainable. The new reality might be of the need for more trust put on one another and of the lodge of certain ideals early on to prevent sabotaging of the societal structures we aim to build.

Introduction

The pandemic of COVID-19 forced governments around the world to promptly consider the possibility of implementing the so-called remote voting ad hoc, or even ‘for good’. It became practically impossible to hold physical elections, yet certain arrangements ought to have been respected - for example, rescheduling the voting for a later day could have violated constitutional arrangements, as it was the case for Poland. Many powers that be opted for postal voting; for example in Bavaria, where the second round of the local elections was held exclusively via mail in late March of 2020. The prevailing uncertainty as to when it would be possible to hold physical elections again made many examine the potential pros or cons of performing long-distance elections. Especially in countries such as already-mentioned Poland, where the matter was considered so close to the election day (10th of May) that it was widely doubted whether the procedure could be even conducted fairly, the legal scrutiny was inflamed - the issues of transparency and appropriateness of the elections as a whole (for instance, because of the impossibility of conducting a fully-fledged audit) were pointed out. It is possible these issues would not pose any threats in the regular, non-pandemic circumstances because the voting could be carefully planned out and the promotion period undisturbed. Having tackled that, are there no other dangers that remote voting would create? No threat of confounding the human right to participate in the government of one’s country through ‘periodic’ and ‘genuine’ elections per article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? Could it be that the uncertainty about the procedure emerged only due to the ‘corona-craze’? Is there sufficient certainty the procedure can be conducted so securely that there are no privacy or secrecy concerns? Or even of transparency? Some argue adamantly that e-, i- or remote voting must infringe upon the law that has been laid out to regulate democratic voting. In this article, a closer look will be taken at the advantages and disadvantages of the general concept of remote voting, from the perspective of human and fundamental rights, tied to the widely-understood rule of law. The analysis will encompass both international and selected national sources of law. This will hopefully allow us to notice, thanks to the wide overlook which comparative law methods are potent of providing, the possible ways to amend certain blemishes and to highlight how the procedure could be conducted without exposing the society to abuses and democratic hazards. The solutions will include tightening of the already widely-discussed existing security measures and examining the available technology, such as the qualified electronic signature. The academia, in a prevailing number of existing publications, focuses on highlighting the dangers of remote voting. Nonetheless, it seems that the practice ought to be explored, rather than denied, for reasons outlined above - pretending that remote voting is not what people gradually strive for is quixotic.

Remote voting has been used, up until the present, primarily to enable migrants, soldiers and delegates, while on a mission, to participate in the political life of their country. Moreover, some states allow inmates to vote without taking the trip to the election office. The possibility of voting while away has also been granted to ensure that it cannot be questioned whether freedoms derived from fundamental rights are lawfully awarded. The fact that the idea of implementing remote voting on a large scale came into the spotlight might have been a reflection of the unique situation, hopefully one of a kind. Seeing the state of New York’s April 2020 permit to request ‘absentee voting’ was only understandable in the contemporary circumstances. Nonetheless, there are also many reasons, considering the present-day globalization (frequent relocating, etc.) and digitalization (the preference for remote interaction at a freely chosen time, reduction of human error, cost-effectiveness) trends, to suspect that the idea of using remote voting en masse will return into the debate sooner or later, now not only for voters unable to arrive at a regular commission, but for all. Moreover, distant voting has been said to be potent of drawing people back to the ballot boxes, precisely because of the convenience the method offers to most. On top of that, many experts claim that internet voting may aid in the eradication of casting invalid votes. In the United States, already in 2000, The Federal Voting Assistance Program ran a pilot project for the presidential elections which involved casting votes via the Internet. It was cancelled in 2004 due to unsatisfactory security results. Nonetheless, online, i-voting, has been considered the next step in the evolution of remote voting for more than two decades now and the mere efforts of a plethora of governments to introduce it logically point in the direction of its further development. Some newer trends additionally highlight the advancement that has been made so far, presenting objectively optimistic results; an example might be the 2020 study of Germann which showed that online voting reduces the amount of errors voters make when casting ballots, which usually leads to the votes being invalid. Ergo, it is of use to create a legal infrastructure for the way of voting in a timely manner, with no unnecessary rush; this may be a paramount factor since in many countries, in order to establish the procedure of remote voting as binding, it will be necessary to amend the primary acts or several procedural regulations. Some claim that establishing a satisfactory remote voting framework is not realistically achievable in the foreseeable future. This might hold true when we consider it has not been implemented on a wide-scale yet, and thus, we might not be aware of many problems it brings or the general strength of the backlash it can receive. However, the concurrent data which proves it is used, and successfully so in some countries, shows the opinion is not well-informed. It is not foolish to say already that we might be fated to remote voting, comes another pandemic or not.

To illuminate, before any discussion can commence, there is a difference between e-voting, i-voting and remote voting, even though all of these names are often used interchangeably or the concepts are considered as one and the same. The former, however, pertains to voting using a machine while being physically supervised by a designated supervisor; the latter, on the other hand, to voting without anybody else necessarily present in the proximity - most commonly, this describes a situation in which an individual votes from their own house, using a postal ballot; or via the internet - in such case, we are speaking of i-voting. This distinction is the simplest one; however, arguably, the most relevant one considering contemporary developments. What will be discussed here is primarily remote voting, with a particular focus on i-voting due to the societal preference for fast, digitised procedures, mostly because the increase in the interest in implementation of the systems has been caused by the need to introduce nationwide quarantines, excluding the possibility of holding traditional or e-voting.

The voting right

To begin, one might have a closer look at what the international legal framework guarantees to all people. There are only a few exceptions of countries that have not ratified the major human right conventions. The aforementioned Universal Declaration of Human Rights has codified an article on voting as follows:

Article 21.

(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.

(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

This has been restated in The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:

Article 25.

Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any ... distinctions ...

and without unreasonable restrictions:

(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;

(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;

(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country;

In turn, the European Convention on Human Rights, binding for 47 states as of 2020, states:

Article 3.

Right to free elections

The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.

At the very minimum then, we can expect the elections and general voting to be: ‘periodic’, held regularly, ‘genuine’, true and actual, not forged at any stage, ‘universal’, accessible to all, ‘equal’, with no votes having less value, ‘secret’ or ‘free’, that is, not constrictive of any discretion. The requirements have been codified in constitutions and other primary acts of different states; to illustrate: the Polish Constitution includes these in articles 96, 97, 127 and 169 (depending on the public position concerned) or the French Constitution in article 3. These are also deemed the ‘constitutional principles of electoral law’ by the European Union.

As it is seen, the laws do not preclude voting remotely. The possibility of introducing alternative voting means has been additionally highlighted by the Council of Europe.

Postal voting - a step in between

A mid-way between the traditional ballot box and the internet engine voting can be postal voting. The method has emerged as the top ad hoc choice among many countries amidst the breakout of the pandemic of COVID-19 - in some for all the citizens, like in Bavaria, or only for the infected ones, like in South Korea. The procedure rests on the distribution of specific envelopes with voting cards, which are then to be completed and handed to the appropriate postal division. The critics of this system highlight several problems with what postal voting is as of present. First of all, casting of physical ballots by correspondence is hazardous as postal systems may render to be inept of securing the handling of the votes to a sufficient extent; this might result in the disappearance of votes or their delayed arrival by the election officials, as it happened during the presidential elections in Poland in June and July 2020. This concern was also scrutinised when Spain requested its overseas citizens to submit both physical and online votes. The letters from Mexico did not arrive on time and in consequence, the online votes, which were deemed not binding and introduced solely for comparative purposes, exceeded the ‘physical’ ones by 200%. Another concern is of the possibility of ingerence with the vote before it reaches its destination, and this could pose threats to the guarantee of secrecy of voting. Some also point at the issue of family or unauthorised answering. The conditions which are at stake then are of ensuring secrecy, freedom of expression, of universality and genuinity. One could attempt at finding solutions to these issues, which could include introducing stricter postal service supervision, sufficiently extensive due days or close identification procedures, potentially combined with a nationwide informatory system whose purpose would be to educate the society on genuine practices. Some of these have been in place. For example, in the United States, the overseas voters, for having their vote count, must complete the so-called ‘Voting oath’. In Germany, the powers that be introduced a transparent system of checks and procedures which includes i.e. the duty of having at least three selected counting commissioners present at all times in the counting office, five when the votes are counted, or of the votes being stored in an office that can be accessed daily by the public. Many of the afore-mentioned problems, however, can also be resolved by opting for an online voting system from the get-go, considering how advanced technology already is and what the societal aspirations, globally, might be - further automatisation and exploitation of intellectual advancement. Some, however, point out the supremacy of physical voting over the Internet one and their reasoning, as will be explored below, is not unfounded.

Fax and online voting

A distinction can be made for three different means of wire or online voting: fax, email, internet (considering that fax messages can nowadays also be sent with the use of computers and the internet).

In 2007, fax voting was supported by 24 states of America. As of now, still approximately half of the US states permit remote voting, either in the form of fax or any other, yet only for, in most cases, military officials and overseas citizens. Alaska, however, permits absentee voting with the use of fax for all of its dwellers. In Europe, fax voting does not seem to be popular. The reason why might be that when faxing was still in wider use, the concept of online voting was not supported on the old continent. Now, when it is being placed in the spotlight, it seems to be purposeless to introduce fax voting when other, more modern and popular means can be used, for example, emails or websites. It is then logical to abandon the consideration of the technique for now.

Email voting as a channel requires the voters to send an email message to an official counting unit with a scan of the vote, typically in the PDF or JPEG format. The image is then checked by the designated election workers, who must ensure it is legitimate and eligible. In Hawaii, all citizens are allowed to return their ballots via email, no matter their status, but only in case the ballot posted to them has not reached their household within five days before the official election day. Overall, the practice showed that emails can be burdened with a hostile malware that then attacks the commission computer and, even, the entire counting software. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the National Association of Election Officials have reported that there are no generally-binding guidelines for how the equipment can be protected from hackers. Also, one could point out that the process of printing out, then filling in and scanning the vote is rather burdensome and possibly unworkable for some because of their lack of access to scanners or sufficiently advanced cameras - this might be a problem that concerns only a small number of individuals; however, assuming that the entire population, even in the Western world, already has undisturbed access to those is imprudent. Email voting, nevertheless, since reliant on scans, potentially reduces some of the dangers related to website or app voting, which will be explored below; yet to give an example already, scans, for example, might render to be harder to forge, unlike votes which are transmitted in the form of a code. This will not be correct in case another form of email voting is in place, one which abandons the scan form in favour of simple electronic exchange, similar to the one characteristic for i-voting (explored below) - casting the vote directly in an email message. This system was temporarily implemented, for example, by the European Parliament in March 2020. In that case, the idea of i-voting had been criticised before being introduced by, inter alia, the German Pirate Party’s MEP, Patrick Breyer. He opposed the project of scan voting, deeming it prone to hacker attacks of Russian spies and others. The politician also pointed out that the MP email accounts are accessible to the European Union staff and hence, it would not be possible to ensure the security and secrecy of the voting. Scan voting, even though risky, is arguably safer than the fully digitalised voting system eventually implemented by the EU institution. Nevertheless, so far, there has been no report of any successful cyber attack on the Parliament, therefore, one might suggest that it is possible to implement a sufficiently secured digital, email voting system which is not susceptible to external infiltration. Despite this, this system, similarly to the PDF one, is not immune to yet another kind of cyber attack, and that is of ‘oversending’ - inundating the inbox with an excessive number of blank or duplicate messages in order to crash the system. There seems to be no way of preventing this but implementing a smart spam-selecting system. There are risks of the software mistaking valid votes for malicious messages; nevertheless, if the programme is designed to reject only messages that have, for instance, at least five identical copies, it will be safe to assume the vote is a result of a hacking scheme.

The last category of voting, a rather broad and many-encompassing one, is the so-called website or app voting, sometimes called just i-voting, which may mistakenly disregard that the aforementioned means also rely on the wire and internet connection. It can take multiple forms; however, the common denominator for all of those is that the voter uses their personal device connected to the internet to cast the vote. First of all, voting can be conducted via a choicely developed portal, as it was done, for instance, in a pilot try-out in Norway in 2011 and 2013 or Great Britain in 2007. In Switzerland, such voting was conducted via a specifically dedicated website; however, it was a part of the regulation that the access to the internet used to submit the votes was to be facilitated by the public provider. The second type of electronic voting is that of the use of an app that can be downloaded onto one’s personal computer. This method has been utilised in Estonia, the European trailblazer of online voting. Estonia has been one of the most eager actors to develop the system of remote internet voting, despite the initial hacking incidents which were serious to the extent that in 2007 the country suffered a massive cyberattack that shut down government, banking and media websites. Nonetheless, already by 2009, the system was well-established, reported to run smoothly and to be sufficiently secured by the ID recognition tools. Starting as a system dedicated only to a narrow group of invalids or expats, those who could not reach the voting commission in person, it can nowadays be used by all the citizens. The third method is voting via a mobile app; it is used, for example, in New South Wales (iVote). A common critique or issue that is put forward when all of these types are discussed is that of ensuring security of the user and the vote throughout the entirety of its relevance.

The issues of i-voting that specialists point out are as follows. Similarly to email voting, internet portals can be hacked and implemented with a malware, which can either shut down the system preventing the people from casting valid votes or alter the results to the liking of the hacker. This has been a major concern of, for example, the French and hence, in 2016, the project of the nation-wide i-voting was dropped (after the alleged interference of Russian hackers with the US elections), and upon the 2017 presidential elections cancelled even for overseas Frenchmen. The secrecy, genuinity and authenticity of the voting can be at stake; or, if the voting is effectively halted, the accessibility to the exercise of one’s right to participate in the governing of their state is lost. Also, some might not be at ease with not having any certainty their vote was casted as they desired it to have been and not manipulated with at any stage of the process. The voter confidence was a critical factor which effectively restrained the introduction of the procedure in some European countries, for instance, Switzerland or the Netherlands. Moreover, the privacy of the individuals can potentially be infringed in the future, due to the potency of the contemporary viruses to implant in discs or because their private information can be used for unknown purposes. Furthermore, the problems of verifiability of the voting seem to emerge; as well as of ensuring that the vote is cast by a person who has a right to cast it, for example, the adult, not their child who might gain access to the computer. On top of that, there might be the problems of guaranteeing that the system works equally well on all the computers or that the nation has sufficient access to the internet.

There have been some solutions proposed to mitigate or eradicate the faults. Many researchers favour the use of blockchain, which allows to conduct exchanges and transactions digitally in a safe way, by keeping the identity of the parties only known to them, in a closed channel, but the value of the transaction public, accessible to all in the general records. The technology is used to record data and depending on the scheme introduced, may also facilitate the transaction accommodating different needs and technicalities. The possibility of having a somewhat open, yet somewhat closed system, which functions on the basis of individual transactions (the nodes tend to be compared to private rooms) seems to be very promising as for the purposes of remote voting, since it could closely resemble the real-life procedure. Nevertheless, the solution has been met with some criticism. Steve M. Newell, project director at AAAS’s Center for Scientific Evidence in Public Issues, pointed out that bringing blockchain onto the debate is like ‘bringing a combination lock to a kitchen fire’, meaning that the technology will not address the security issues that concern most lawyers. Indeed, blockchain as such is merely a storage technology; however, there are possible solutions which can be developed around the system to ensure sufficient protection of the data and individual identities. For example, it has been proposed that the historic record of votes could be available to everybody, allowing even the ordinary citizens to check whether one has manipulated their vote or casted it illegally. This could be based on a system of comparing versions of the database from different points in time. Such approach has been utilised in Norway, not for the purposes of using a blockchain system but to ensure the votes are cast once only. Nevertheless, Newell said that the transparency offered by the mechanism is not sufficient and would not quench doubts that some could have about the validity or actuality of the procedure. The importance of transparency must not be undermined. In Germany, i-voting procedures were deemed unconstitutional precisely due to the alleged infringement of the principles of publicity and transparency by the system which did not permit full public control. Blockchain cannot offer complete accessibility, not to compromise anonymity. The ultimate conclusion of most, however, is that blockchain can be used for voting; nonetheless, a new specifically designed software would have to be designed so it can functionally secure political elections. Many point out that i-voting brings within a change in political reality and stirs the form of what contemporary political trust is. Paradoxically then, the discussed shortcomings of blockchain could be overcome anyway, simply because the voting framework as we know it would change is i-voting opted for; the alterations would have to be designed for what i-voting being the reality is, not for what we take it for in the present-day, prenatal stage.

The system for ensuring transparency and maintaining the voters’ confidence seems to have been already developed. For example, in Norway, in 2011, an SMS confirmatory system was implemented, in which after the initial transmission of the vote, the person would receive a message onto their mobile phone with an appropriate code which then the voter could verify with a password sheet they had received in regular mail. If the vote was casted incorrectly or altered by the system, it could be corrected. This scheme did not only allow the voters to have more control over their voting but, arguably, contributed to the guaranteeing that there was a closer supervision of what choice was actually made.

To ensure transparency and, in connection, reliability, some suggest the implementation of an auditing function, which, in order not to be susceptible to external influence, would have to be built on internally. Some systems include the so-called ‘voter verified audit trail’ (VVPAT), also known as the ‘voter verified paper ballot’ system. These systems produce paper versions of the vote casted, just so the choices can be reviewed by a designated person at a later time. The vote must be checked by the voter before it is officially submitted. In the ‘voter verifiable audit trail’ system, on the other hand, the voters do not have to check their votes. If they have not, a notification is sent out to the system’s administrators. Some other regulators decide to include the disclosure of the source code and/or documentation, just so anybody, including the voters, can review the very root of the system and check how the software is handling the votes.

Interestingly enough, it seems that the paper verification systems end up being gradually abandoned in favour of electronic verification systems. Hypothetically, this might be yet another sign of the widely-embraced digitalisation of contemporary societies. Having an internal auditing programme seems to be crucial to ensure not only that the vote is secure and verifiable but also that it does not let the public doubt the legitimacy of the process they partake in. What is crucial is that the audit system allows independent observers to monitor the elections without allowing them to interfere with the results in any way. The software must also be potent of detecting any fraud or infringement and reporting on it no matter who is the source of the interference - any change should be disclosed, just so the public is certain that even the government has not unlawfully intervened with the data. Lastly, the system must be resistant to errors or shut downs, hence, it must be large enough and again, equipped with privacy securities, for example, double or triple encryption. Auditing is rather conveyed for all votes or voting means; however, it might be interesting to point out that when states were adapting e-voting, that is, voting using machines in the polling stations, audit was recommended only for a selected number of devices, for example, it was three out of hundred in Brazil. The country has tested out many auditing means, also the digital ones, and some concluded that a fully reliable auditing is not feasible. This opinion seems to refer to the fact that it might be difficult to ensure and sufficiently announce how the system works and who has access to it - the public might still doubt its reliability since it must rely on the governmental assertion that it does not have the ability to interfere with it. Yet, is it even possible to create a system of non-intervention? At the end of the day, at least its creator must have full access to it. Creating a complete black box is undesirable as one might predict, since having no overview of how the system handles the data leads to obtaining no certainty and understandably, no transparency.

Qualified electronic signatures - a solution?

What seems not to be explored in depth is the possibility of securing the i-voting with the use of qualified electronic signatures. It is strange to the extent that in the EU, in particular, the use of signatures has been harmonised first in the The Electronic Signatures Directive 1999/93/EC and then, from 2016, by eIDAS, the regulation (hence, directly applicable law) on Electronic Identification, Authentication and Trust Services. Per Article 3(12) included within, a qualified electronic signature is ‘(...) an advanced electronic signature that is created by a qualified electronic signature creation device, and which is based on a qualified certificate for electronic signatures’. Article 25 stipulates that such signature is equally valid to a handwritten signature. Further, Article 27 clarifies that it is possible for Member States to permit the use of such signatures in an online service offered by a public body. This allows us to conclude with certainty that such signatures could be used for the purposes of national i-voting. Why would this be desirable? First of all, qualified electronic signatures are the most advanced types of e-signatures. They consist of three components: an advanced electronic signature [which does not have its official definition but as set out in Article 3(11) in conjunction with Article 26, it should a) be uniquely linked to the signatory b) capable of identifying the signatory c) created using means that the signatory can use on their own d) linked to the data so any change in the data will be detectable], a qualified certificate and a secure-signature-creation device that must comply with Annexes I-III of the regulation. Even though qualified electronic signatures do not grant any more reliability than any other signature type, it is arguably the most solid means in terms of ensuring authenticity and continuous genuinity. The system could be transposed onto i-voting, to verify votes. The use of certificates which all citizens would have to obtain would provide for the legitimacy. The requirement for having the signature created in a certain way could also safeguard authenticity. The prerequisite included in Article 26(d) of the Regulation, of having the signature be made so there is no doubt whether it has been interfered with, also allows to predict such procedure would be potent of ensuring that the doings are conveyed legally. Certainly, one of the biggest obstacles of the concept is that the signature must be created with the use of a device specifically dedicated to it. As much as it might be a mere wish presently, one could imagine that the systems used in the prescribed signature devices could be transposed onto personal computers in the form of apps or software. It would be an ambitious enterprise, yet seemingly not impossible to convey. If that is accomplished, all the already existing systems, such as postal or SMS double-check would be unnecessary to uphold, and the widely-understood development could continue its strive towards minimalism and utmost convenience. What goes without saying, introducing similar technical requirements is advised for the countries from outside of the EU, as the regulatory framework as designed seems to be satisfactory.

Conclusion

The presented analysis revealed several accuracies. First of all, the systems of remote voting have been tested in many countries around the world. Amidst the outbreak of COVID-19, most governments opted for traditional postal voting; however, in the past, some states had tested also means of i-voting, via fax, mail or online portals or apps, predominantly relying on the security means offered by the traditional postal voting. As it emerged, postal voting is still deemed potent of ensuring that the pivotal features of voting, spoken of in many international and constitutional acts, are respected and sufficiently protected. The voting mode is not defectless; nevertheless, most of the issues associated with it can be resolved by what the other type of remote voting, via the internet, offers - at the very least, convenience and the lack of dangers inherent to physical interferences. In spite of that, it has been argued that i-voting is more susceptible to elusive manipulation. Sometimes the systems might be shut down because of a human incursion, sometimes because of a mere technical error. What goes without saying is that it is not surprising that many doubt whether at any point in time humans should rely on i-voting - it may be too fragile and too uncertain. What comes to mind as well, yet has not been directly highlighted by the academia to a significant extent, is that remote voting, no matter the means, could be used as a tool for controlling or fabricating the results by governments, as has been pointed out by, for example, the opposition upon the decision of the Polish government to make use of remote voting instead of rescheduling of the 2020 presidential elections in May 2020.

There are many and various advantages and disadvantages of either technique or method used. It has been assumed that i-voting is the future of voting in general, hence, most of this paper was dedicated to exploring methods of improving the online systems, to devoid them of the flaws that make them susceptible to failures and external incursions. The solutions explored were blockchains, check systems, internal audit softwares and qualified electronic signatures - all of them having in common the potency to bring the practice of i-voting closer to perfection or the desirable degree of trustworthiness. They have not been compared to one another but rather outlined to allow one to explore the ideas or solutions, already implemented for i-voting or not, to notice the possible abundance of aiding means. It seems futile to draw any definitive conclusions, first of all, because many of these can be and possibly should be combined to ensure that the practice of i-voting becomes implemented and accepted by the wide public, and second of all, because until the means are introduced and tested, there is no certainty how they can actually perform. One could say that sole testing out of different possibilities puts the protection of human and fundamental rights at too much risk and hence should not be implemented at any point. This thinking, if not only limitative, might also have drastic consequences, which to some extent many countries have experienced already because of the sudden outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic - much political and legal havoc was created simply because the states found themselves at crossroads, having to invent satisfactorily solutions within weeks or just a couple of months, which, in times when all efforts were to be put into supporting the medical and economic branches, was nothing but undesirable.

The regulators are urged to consider the points highlighted in this piece to design and endorse a satisfactory system of i-voting, just so, apart from the other, more anthropological arguments of human development towards convenience or fully unrestricted mobility, there is no repetition of the problematic situation some governments had to face upon the obligatory lockdowns. Technology and law are to facilitate human development. It is not difficult to imagine that postponing of the organic development of either might lead to the creation of unwanted or comical situations. Hence, instead of nipping i-voting in the bud, also in such a non-uniform manner (considering some states, such as Estonia, have been developing it with much enthusiasm and some have not even implemented study groups to explore the nature of i-voting) might be more damaging than the method itself, as some argue. I-voting may become inevitable one way or another and hence, possibly, we should consider conforming our views, priorities and systems, in case the gloomy predictions of some specialists render to be accurate and full protection of the remote procedure is unattainable. The new reality might be of the need for more trust put on one another and of the lodge of certain ideals early on to prevent sabotaging of the societal structures we aim to build. This might be a very idealistic outlook, a possibly fabulous one. Hence, if convenience wins with the need for reliability, we might just find ourselves in the reality in which privacy is willingly waved; and in such a case, we must ensure that we can reduce the associated risks to the bare minimum, just so we do not wake up in the world of Orwell’s ‘1984’, in which the truth is bended to the liking of the one in control.